Reasons to Act on Your Best Guess: A Reply to the Challenge of Unawareness
This post is a submission to the Cluelessness Critiques Essay Competition.
Anthony DiGiovanni’s sequence, The challenge of unawareness for impartial altruist action guidance (henceforth “the sequence”), argues that impartial altruists have no non-arbitrary reason to prefer any decision over any other. The central problem is unawareness: “many possible consequences of our actions haven’t even occurred to us in much detail, if at all.”
I disagree. Impartial altruists should act as if we have precise probabilities for beliefs and precise expected utilities of decisions, even if we (usually) do not explicitly state them. It’s okay to act on heuristics, but those heuristics are in service of maximizing the expected value of a (non-literal) utility function, rather than being “terminal” heuristics.
“Act as if” means: either I give an explicit precise credence; or I don’t, but I operate under the assumption that I could give a precise credence if I spent enough time reasoning through my beliefs.
This post starts by explaining the sequence’s central arguments in my own words. Then it offers five defenses of acting on your best guess.
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